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The war on terrorism has not reduced the threat from terrorism.  Terrorism as a tactic 
cannot be defeated.  States policies cannot rely on force alone in an attempt to defeat the 
use of a tactic.  States need to use more effective counterterrorism policy options than 
coercion and force to deter groups from using terrorism.  Groups choose to use terrorism 
as a tactic as a means to bring attention to be engaged and their grievances addressed.  
Engaging groups that use terrorism to address and resolve their grievances can prevent 
the cycle of violence of a terrorism campaign and delegitimize their use of force to 
resolve grievances.  Economic development of developing nations can produce strong 
institutions necessary for minority groups to resolve grievances and build internally 
balanced market economies in developing nations that allow them to fully participate in 
economic globalization and reap the security benefits of globalization.      
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nine years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the war on terrorism 
has not reduced the threat from terrorism.1  It is time for states to consider that, maybe, a 
war on terror cannot be won, and that we should consider alternative approaches to 
deterring the use of violence by minority groups to redress their grievances.  Would a 
combined policy of engagement with disaffected groups, economic development for 
disaffected groups, and continued deterrence to the use of violence be a more effective 
counterterrorism policy than coercive policies that perpetuate the cycle of violence in a 
terrorist campaign?  This thesis will examine whether it can be more effective for states 
to counter minority groups’ use of violence by engaging with them, addressing their 
grievances, and developing them economically, while continuing to deter attacks. 
A. IMPORTANCE 
Terrorism, defined as violence perpetrated against a target selected to manipulate 
a larger target audience.2 Terrorism is a tactic that is an option for minority groups 
disaffected from a base of power.  As an asymmetric threat, terrorism is inherently 
indefensible.3  Force alone cannot defeat the use of the tactic of terrorism however, and 
state policies that rely on force and take a hard-line stance against negotiating with 
terrorist organizations perpetuate the cycle of violence of a terrorist campaign.4  
There is a need for analysis and recommendations for how states can effectively 
engage disaffected groups to deter and prevent them from turning to the use of violence 
and the tactic of terrorism to redress their grievances.  This thesis has researched state 
policies toward terrorism and offers specific recommendations for states to engage and 
develop groups to successfully deter terrorism.  
                                                 
1 Ivan Sascha Sheehan,  "Has the Global War on Terror Changed the Terrorist Threat? A Time-Series 
Intervention Analysis," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 8 (2009), 758. 
2 Jeffrey Bale, lecture, “Introduction to Terrorism,” 2009, Naval Postgraduate School. 
3 Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World (New York, 
NY: Springer, 2006), 208.  
4 Sheehan,  "Has the Global War on Terror Changed the Terrorist Threat?" 758. 
 2
B. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will first define terrorism, and then the cycle of violence of a 
counterterrorist campaign that relies on coercion alone.  Having established a clear 
definition of terrorism and having demonstrated the futility of counterterrorism policies 
that rely on coercion alone, this thesis will make a case for counterterrorism policies that 
focus on engaging disaffected minority groups to redress their grievances and develop 
them economically as well.  Lastly, this thesis will apply the principles of engagement, 
development, and deterrence to a case study of the Middle East in specific terms related 
to the groups and their grievances, their potential for economic development, and 
prospects for continued deterrence.  
The reasoning behind this organization is to arrive at policy recommendations for 
states that are based on fairly generic principles that can be used now as well as in the 
future against any potential groups with grievances that may lead them to turn to the use 
of the tactic of terrorism. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The body of published materials relevant to this thesis includes numerous studies, 
reports and literature produced in the form of government reports, journal articles, and 
scholarly books.  In reviewing the literature on countering terrorism, there is a common 
theme on the use of force on the part of the government creating an action-reaction cycle 
of violence that perpetuates terrorist campaigns.  There is disagreement on the relevance 
of terrorist motivation in countering terrorism, and there is a significant difference of 
opinion on how to deal with terrorist groups.  This review will clarify the stated position 
regarding the consensus, disagreement, and the gap in the literature. 
1. Consensus 
As defined by Martha Crenshaw, terrorism is the violent means by which a 
disaffected minority group without access to a base of power seeks radical change.5 As 
there are no shortage of disaffected minority groups throughout the world, terrorism is 
                                                 
5 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981), 383–384. 
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not about to go away.  On the contrary, terrorist attacks continue and are increasing in 
lethality, despite the counterterrorism policies of the states they are targeting.6  Security 
measures alone will not prevent states from suffering terrorist attacks; the asymmetric 
nature of terrorism makes it something that cannot be prevented by defense alone.7   
According to Martha Crenshaw, a precipitating event often precedes the outbreak 
of terrorism, and there seems to be a common pattern of government actions that act as 
catalysts for terrorism.  Government use of force in response often compels terrorist 
retaliation.  The development of such an action-reaction syndrome then establishes the 
structure of the conflict between the regime and its challengers.8  Richard English agrees 
with this point and also recommends that state’s counterterrorism policies address those 
root causes.9  This point is further illustrated by U.S. actions in the Global War on Terror.  
The U.S. has increased terrorism by using force, which is being perceived as unjust, and 
driving ordinary people to accept the logic of terrorism as a response to the U.S. use of 
force.10 
Mark Sedgwick makes the point that the origins of terrorist campaigns against a 
state are often based on a cause, and understanding that cause is critical.  The conflict 
cannot be understood without understanding the prior history and cause concerned. 11  
Thus, there is a need to look at the history of a conflict and potentially address the cause 
of the terrorism to counter the terrorist organization.   
Daniel Byman makes a strong case with his proposed strategy to delegitimize 
terrorist groups to deny them access to their pool of potential recruits.  This would have 
to be incorporated into a balanced strategy and could possibly be implemented toward 
                                                 
6 Daniel Masters, “The Origin of Terrorist Threats: Religious, Separatist, or Something Else?” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (October 2009), 396. 
7 Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World (New York: 
Springer, 2006), 208. 
8 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 385. 
9 Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 123. 
10 Ivan Sascha Sheehan, "Has the Global War on Terror Changed the Terrorist Threat?" 758. 
11 Mark Sedgwick, “Inspiration and the Origins of Global Waves of Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 30, no. 2 (February 2007), 97. 
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disgruntled minority groups before they turn to violence to pursue their goals.12  There is 
a recommended forty-step plan proposed for the United States.13 While this plan is fairly 
comprehensive, it still leaves the action-reaction cycle intact and offers no insight on how 
to deter the terrorist campaign. 
Most of the consensus in countering terrorism starts after the precipitating event 
that triggered the terrorist campaign and government reaction after that point.  There is 
less agreement on how military force should be used to counter terrorists, but there is still 
agreement on the necessity of using military force to counter terrorist organizations, even 
though going after a terrorist organization with force creates more backlash and does not 
always spell victory in an asymmetric fight.14     
2. Disagreement 
The disagreement in the literature centers on how to counterterrorism once the 
action-reaction cycle has begun.  The prescriptions divide mainly into two schools of 
thought: change domestic law enforcement to facilitate measures to pursue, arrest, and 
prosecute terrorists or use military force to destroy terrorist organizations and their ability 
to operate.   There is additional disagreement on the state of mind of the terrorist and 
what effect a state’s policies reasonably have on a terrorist who is irrational versus one 
who is rational.    
U.K. case studies focus on the response to the Provisional IRA in Northern 
Ireland and the legislative changes made in 1968 on domestic law enforcement changes 
to counter the terrorist threat.15  The focus is similar in the Italian response to terrorism 
from 1969 and 1982: rewriting legislation in 1979 and its resulting effects on the Italian’s 
                                                 
12 Daniel Byman, The Five Front War (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 77. 
13 Peter Bergen and Laurence Footer “Defeating the Attempted Global Jihadist Insurgency: Forty 
Steps for the Next President to Pursue against al Qaeda,” The Annals of the American Academy 618, no. 1 
(July 2008),  232–246. 
14 Grace Sanico and Makoto Kakinaka “Terrorism and Deterrence Policy with Transnational Support,” 
Defence and Peace Economics 19, no. 2 (April 2002), 155. 
15 David Bonner, “The United Kingdom Response to Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 4, 
no. 4 (1992), 179. 
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ability to counter terrorism.16 A German case study notes the state’s initial tendency to be 
soft on terrorism for fear of being perceived as fascist, but then ultimately adopted more 
hard-line policies toward terrorism primarily by enacting stronger legislation.17  Analysis 
of U.S. historical reactions to the Klu Klux Klan and Black Panther organizations showed 
similar success stories achieved by law enforcement means.18  Case studies from the 
U.K., Italy, Germany, and the U.S. detail success made in law enforcement in reaction to 
terrorist activity.  An Israeli case study differs in that it reflects the Israeli decision to 
treat terrorism as an extension of war between states, and the resultant negative political 
effects of that decision.19 
That organizations wage campaigns of terror based on a political or ideological 
goals is not up for dispute.20  The main issue is to what extent that original grievance 
continues to drive a terrorist organization once the cycle of action-reaction has begun.  
Crenshaw argues that even though a terrorist group’s reasons for resorting to terrorism 
are an important cause, ultimately even if there is an objective response to those reasons, 
terrorism may still endure until the group is physically destroyed.21  Max Abrams rejects 
the conventional wisdom of terrorists as rational actors and finds them to be more 
socially motivated than politically or ideologically motivated.  He recommends that a 




                                                 
16 Luciana Stortoni-Wortmann, “The Police Response to Terrorism in Italy from 1969 to 1983,” in 
Fernando Reinares, ed., European Democracies Against Terrorism (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 2000).  
17 Stephen M. Sobieck, “Democratic Responses to International Terrorism in Germany,” in David A. 
Charters, ed., The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: It’s Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberties in Six Countries 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 53. 
18 Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda (New York, 
NY: Rutledge, 2003), 99. 
19 Noemi Gal-Or, “Countering Terrorism in Israel,” in Charters, ed., The Deadly Sin of Terrorism, 
134. 
20 Walter Enders and Todd Sandler “The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-
Autoregression-Intervention Analysis,” The American Political Science Review 87, no. 4 (December 1993), 
829. 
21 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 397. 
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and cites the example of the Italians in the 1980s releasing prisoners in exchange for 
cooperation against their fellow terrorists and the collapse of the network that followed 
the break-down of the social ties of the group.22   
The existing literature focuses largely on the ideology and psychology of 
terrorists, with much of the dispute centering on whether they are rational or irrational 
actors.  There is additional disagreement about understanding why terrorist groups 
conduct terrorist campaigns, but most conclude that it is difficult to determine the exact 
motivations of terrorist organizations and offer no significant recommendations on how 
to use the ideology and psychology of terrorist groups to counter their use of violence.  
3. Gaps in Literature 
What is missing from the literature is a discussion of different precipitous 
moments from past terrorist campaigns, as well as a critical analysis of the policy 
decisions made following the initial precipitating event and the resulting action-reaction 
syndrome that escalates the terrorist campaign.   The decisions are noted in passing as 
part of larger studies, but not as the primary focus, and it seems that is a critical gap in the 
research and literature. While the United States has sometimes been effective in changing 
the policies of states that instigate or assist terrorism is has not found an appropriate mix 
of deterrence and reward that can constrain the behavior of nonstate adversaries.23   
4. Conclusion 
Violence will remain an option for groups with grievances, whether they are 
religious, ideological or political, and existing terrorist groups will continue their 
campaigns.24 Appropriate state responses to violence will be key in countering the use of  
 
 
                                                 
22 Max Abrams, “What Terrorists Really Want,” International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008), 105. 
23 Martha Crenshaw, “Coercive Diplomacy and the Response to Terrorism,” in The United States and 
Coercive Diplomacy, Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., (Washington, DC: United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 2003), 4. 
24 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006), 234. 
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violence and would be more effective with a better understanding of underlying 
grievances,25 in order to prevent the action-reaction syndrome between a state and 
terrorists in an extended conflict. 
D.  METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will utilize a comparative case study approach to analyze different 
states that have been targeted by terrorist campaigns and those state counterterrorism 
policies.  The analysis will focus on distinguishing states that used violence alone to 
counter terrorist campaigns, and compare and contrast the results of those counterterrorist 
campaigns with states that engaged terrorist groups.  The measure of effectiveness of the 
counterterrorism policies will be the level of violence of the terrorist campaigns, and the 
duration of the terrorist campaigns.   
The sources of data for these studies will be official state policies on 
counterterrorism, and existing case studies of individual terrorist campaigns.  The 
practical constraints of this evidence will be the difference between stated state policies 
versus actions taken by states.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will first define terrorism, and then the cycle of violence of a 
counterterrorist campaign that relies on coercion alone.  Having established a clear 
definition of terrorism and having demonstrated the futility of counterterrorism policies 
that rely on coercion alone, this thesis will make a case for counterterrorism policies that 
focus on engaging disaffected minority groups to redress their grievances and develop 
them economically as well.  Lastly, this thesis will apply the principles of engagement, 
development, and deterrence to a case study of the Middle East in specific terms related 
to the groups and their grievances, their potential for economic development, and 
prospects for continued deterrence.  
                                                 
25 Steve Hewitt, The British War on Terror (London: Continuum, 2008), 119. 
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The reasoning behind this organization is to arrive at policy recommendations for 
states that are based on fairly generic principles that can be used now as well as in the 
future against any potential groups with grievances that may lead them to turn to the use 







A. TERRORISM DEFINED 
Defining terrorism seems to be very difficult, there is no state, agency, or 
academic consensus on defining terrorism, which leaves us with over 100 different 
definitions of terrorism.26  For example, the U.S. State Department, Department of 
Defense (DoD), and FBI each have different definitions of terrorism: The U.S. State 
Department defines terrorism as ‘Premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetuated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, 
usually intended to influence an audience’, while the U.S. Department of Defense defines 
terrorism as ‘the unlawful use of, or threatened use of, force or violence against 
individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments or societies, often to 
achieve political, religious or ideological objectives,’ and the FBI defines terrorism as 
‘the use of serious violence against persons or property, or the threat to use such violence, 
to intimidate or coerce a government, the public, or any section of the public in order to 
promote political, social or ideological objectives.’   
The variations in definitions from these three U.S. institutions tasked with 
countering terrorism illustrate the case of the difficulty of defining terrorism: Is it 
violence, perpetuated violence, or threatened violence that constitutes terrorism?  Is it 
done to influence and audience, to promote an objective or to achieve an objective?  The 
differences in these definitions are significant enough to lead to confusion and 
ambiguities between the institutions that are working to counter terrorism. 
This thesis will use the following definition of terrorism for its succinctness in 
what actions and intentions constitute terrorism, and its inclusiveness of different groups 
and their objectives: Terrorism is violence consciously perpetrated against a target 
selected to influence the attitude and behavior of a larger target audience.27  The key with 
this definition, as clarified by Professor Bale is that it distinguishes itself from other 
                                                 
26  Albert J. Jongman Schmid et al., Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, 
Data Bases, Theories, and Literature, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1988,  5–6. 
27 Jeffrey Bale, lecture, “Introduction to Terrorism,” 2009, Naval Postgraduate School. 
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forms of violence and their victims by including the intent for the violence against the 
victim to influence a larger target audience.  This author would also argue that this 
definition works better than the examples provided as it does not try to define terrorism 
by the type of violence or by the intended influence, just that they are using violence to 
influence a larger target audience.   
This definition also serves to clarify that terrorism is a tactic, not unique to a 
particular group, or ideology.  It is important to clarify that as a tactic, terrorism cannot 
be defeated per se, it is violence for psychological effect, and any group can choose to 
use it as a tactic.  While a tactic itself cannot be defeated, what can be countered is the 
group’s choice to use the tactic of terrorism, and the actual act of violence can be 
deterred.  
As a tactic, terrorism is an inherently asymmetric threat in that it is not seeking to 
perpetrate violence directly against its intended audience, but against a target selected to 
influence that audience.  Groups that choose to use terrorism as a tactic do so because 
they cannot stand toe-to-toe with their adversary, so instead they seek to create 
psychological pressure and force concessions to their demands by attacking vulnerable 
targets.28  So a group intending to influence the U.S. does not have to take on U.S. forces, 
or perpetrate violence against well defended or hardened targets to get at the U.S., they 
can instead chose a target more to their liking, that will still have the effect of influencing 
the U.S..   
As an asymmetric threat, there is really no such thing as a perfect defense to 
prevent all acts of terrorism from being perpetrated.29   Terrorism is inherently 
indefensible.  That is not to say that states should not deter terrorism, but to say that it’s 
more a question of reducing terrorism than preventing it entirely.  Having defined what 
constitutes terrorism as a tactic, the next question is; why do groups use terrorism? 
 
                                                 
28 Daniel Masters, "The Origin of Terrorist Threats: Religous, Separatist, or Something Else?" 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 2008: 396–414. 
29 Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World (New York, 
NY: Springer, 2006), 208.  
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B.  WHY DO GROUPS USE TERRORISM? 
Terrorist campaigns are directed against a state to achieve an effect on behalf of a 
cause.  To deter the use of terrorism the cause must be understood.30   Having established 
that groups use terrorism to influence a larger audience, the next step will be to establish 
why it is that groups with grievances choose violence as a means to redress their 
grievances.  
In addressing why groups use terrorism, the objective of this portion will be to 
analyze the steps that lead to a terrorist campaign, not necessarily the motivations and 
ideology that lead to terrorist campaigns.  The reason for this is that this thesis is aimed at 
providing a recommendation that can work vs. any terrorism campaign irrespective of the 
group’s ideology and motivations.  In making the case of why groups use terrorism, this 
section will first focus on their reasons, and then on the sequence of events the lead up to 
a group’s decision to use terrorism to redress their grievances.   
Understanding why groups resort to terrorism is important; groups chose to use 
terrorism to achieve a stated goal, and therefore their reasons are an important part of the 
cause of terrorism.  Terrorism can be seen as a means to achieve a variety of different 
goals from nationalist to separatist, but the most basic reason that groups are choosing 
terrorism is to gain attention, recognition, and manipulation for whatever their goal is.  
Terrorism can also be used to provoke an overreaction from government use of force, and 
thereby prove the perceived heavy handedness of government and draw additional 
attention to the group’s goals.  It is understandable why a group that is disaffected from a 
base of power could see terrorism as an attractive, simple and inexpensive way of 
achieving their goals.31 
To make the case for the flow of events that lead to a terrorist campaign, it has 
been argued by Martha Crenshaw that the first condition that directly contributes to 
terrorism is a minority group with a grievance, and most importantly the perception that 
                                                 
30 Mark Sedgwick, "Inspiration and the Origins of Global Waves of Terrorism," Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 2007: 97–112. 
31 Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism." Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981),  385–
387.  
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this condition is unjust.  The fact of a minority group having a grievance is not enough, 
because a lot of sub groups living among larger populations have grievances and do not 
turn to terrorism or even violence.  The perception of this grievance being unjust is what 
motivates groups to act on those grievances.   
The second condition for terrorism is argued to be the disaffection from a base of 
political power.  If groups have are denied access to legitimate redress of grievances, this 
further sets the stage for terrorism.  Minority groups with grievances is one thing, but 
when those groups are neglected, or restricted from access to the means of change, then 
their perceived unjust grievances are left to fester and boil until the build to the point of 
taking action, which leads to the last condition.   
The third condition is a precipitous event that precedes the outbreak of a terrorist 
campaign.  This is commonly government actions that act as a catalyst for the groups to 
turn to terrorism to redress their grievances.  Government use of force in response to 
protests or dissent often compels minority group retaliation and starts an action-reaction 
syndrome that establishes the structure of a terrorism campaign vs. state counterterrorism 
policies.  Government use of force in response to grievances is perceived as intolerably 
unjust, and the use of terrorism becomes a morally acceptable option for redress of 
grievances.32 
In this model of the setting of the start of a terrorist campaign, the group’s reasons 
for resorting to terrorism constitute an important part of the cause of the terrorist 
campaign.  There is a need for analysis and recommendations for how states can 
effectively engage disaffected groups to redress their grievances to prevent them from 
turning to the use of violence and the tactic of terrorism to redress their grievances.   
This understanding of why groups use terrorism and how a terrorism campaign 
gets started is critical for states to understand in making policy decisions to effectively 
counter terrorism.  Understanding that a group chooses to use terrorism to draw attention 
to a goal or to provoke an overreaction from the state provides the state an opportunity to 
seize the attention garnered from the terrorism attack and instead of a heavy handed 
                                                 
32 Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 383–385. 
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overreaction to the attack, can instead choose to use the attack to draw negative attention 
to the groups choice to use violence to achieve their goal and therefore delegitimize the 
group’s goal.  As this paper will argue further on, delegitimizing the groups use of 
violence alone will not successfully deter the use of terrorism, as that would still leave the 
group with an unresolved grievance and in the model provided, still no means of 
legitimate redress of grievances.  What this means is that to successfully deter groups 
from using terrorism, states have to respond by delegitimizing the use of violence as well 
as engaging the groups that chose to use terrorism and address their grievances. 
Having established what terrorism is, why groups use it, and how it is that a 
terrorist campaign can begin, the question then is what policies can a state implement to 
counter the use of terrorism, and which of those policies has proven to be the most 
effective? 
1. Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Policies 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 demonstrated that terrorism has escalated to an 
international problem that poses a threat to international peace and security.33  Al Qaeda 
and other terrorist groups have also declared themselves to be in a fight to the death 
against the United States.  In a world with a persistent threat that is capable of threatening 
international peace and security, what can states do to counter terrorism? 
In studying state counterterrorism policies, they are typically divided into two 
categories: coercion and conciliatory.  Coercive policy is based on the idea that attacking 
terrorists will deter other terrorist attacks by establishing a reputation for being tough on 
terrorism.  The idea behind coercive policies is that to not respond aggressively or to 
concede to terrorist demands would earn a state a reputation as soft on terrorism and  
therefore encourage more terrorism.  Conciliatory policies on the other hand function 
under the idea that states should address the underlying causes of terrorism to 
delegitimize their use of terrorism as a tactic.34   
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Support." Defense and Peace Economics, 2007, 165.  
34 Miller, Terrorism and Political Violence (2007), 332. 
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How effective has coercion been as a policy in counterterrorism?   Since 
approximately 1972, the U.S. policy has had four key principles: no concession to 
terrorist demands, diplomatic and economic sanctions against states that sponsored 
terrorism, enforcement of the rule of law by bringing terrorist to trial, multilateral 
cooperation.35  How has that worked out for the U.S. in countering terrorism?  It that 
thought we have declared a war on terrorism, we have not been winning that war as 
terrorism has increased.  Coercive policy is intended to persuade an opponent to stop an 
action.  In the case of a state, a regime may be willing to comply with a coercer’s 
demands as the cost of the consequence of defiance may be more than the state could risk 
and remain solvent.  But what about the case of a non-state actor like Al Qaeda?  What 
does Al Qaeda have to lose by not giving in to coercive demands?  
If terrorism as defined by this thesis as violence perpetrated against a target 
selected to manipulate a larger audience is an available tactic for groups with grievances 
that are disaffected from a base of power, can it be stopped by force alone?  If the 
grievance is perceived as legitimate by a population, and the use of force used to destroy 
groups that use terrorism to redress perceived legitimate grievances is perceived as 
unjust, there will be no shortage of the population that embrace the group and its use of 
terrorism to resolve their grievances.   Use of force alone, without incorporating some 
means of addressing the group grievances sets coercive counterterrorism policies up for a 
fight to the death over a group’s grievance.  This is also argued to be the case of crisis of 
legitimacy when state use of force is perceived as illegitimate or unjust it enrages 
ordinary people and they begin to accept the logic of terrorism as a legitimate means of 
resolving their grievances.36 
Though Coercion and Conciliatory are the two most common ways of 
categorizing state counterterrorism policies, are those two terms over simplifying the 
case?  Are there more options than just fighting or giving in? 
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This thesis will argue that a better way of representing state counterterrorism 
policy options would be to present them in five different categories: Do nothing, 
Conciliation, Legal Reform, Restriction, Violence.37  A state policy to do nothing 
includes ignoring terrorism and refusing to apprehend terrorists operating in their 
country.  Legal reforms strengthen the government’s ability to deal with terrorism.  States 
use conciliation by negotiating with terrorists to resolve a crisis or to forestall a future 
crisis.  Restrictions are measures taken to limit a group’s support and activities.  Violence 
refers to a government’s use of force to kill perpetrators of terrorism and their supporters.  
These were the categories used in a study of which states policies have been most 
effective in decreasing terrorism.   
Of these clearer options for state counterterrorism policies, which is most 
effective in countering terrorism?  According to the study the study by Miller, it is not 
that one single strategy is more successful than others, but that multiple strategies can be 
more effective in decreasing terrorism.  His study of the subject also showed that 
successful counterterrorism policies also depended on the group’s motivations.  One of 
the more important findings of the study was that violent counterterrorism policies were 
only used in two out of ten successful counterterrorism campaigns, and that violence was 
used in ten of the twenty-one unsuccessful counterterrorism policies.   
There are successful non-violent policy options to counter terrorism, and that it is 
necessary to understand the group’s motivations to determine the most successful policy 
combinations.  Separatist groups respond better to a combination of concessions, legal 
reform, and restrictions, while religious groups are undeterred by most policies but are 
limited by their ability to carry out attacks when states emphasize restriction.38  What this 
proves is that there are successful non-violent policy options for states to counter 
terrorism. 
This supports the finding by Perl in his report to Congress where he concluded 
that effective counterterrorism policies need to be configured for each group, based on 
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38 Miller, "Confronting Terrorism: Group Motivation and Succesful State Policies." Terrorism and 
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their goals, strategies, and operating environment.39  There is no one cookie-cutter 
approach to counterterrorism that will work for all groups.  So the famous hard line 
position “We will not negotiate with terrorists” is not the most effective way of 
countering terrorism.  Depending on the group, negotiating with them may actually be the 
most effective way to countering their use of terrorism as a tactic.   
Miller’s study established that there are effective non-violent policy options for 
reducing terrorism, but what effect do counterterrorism policies based on violence have 
on terrorism?  If non-violent policies are able to reduce terrorism, is it possible for violent 
state policies to increase terrorism?  The answer from different studies appears to be yes.  
First was a study that questioned the effectiveness of hawkish policies versus a 
transnational terrorist threat.  In this study, the term hawkish policies were characterized 
as military use of force.  In examining this question, the study focused on the strategic 
interactions between the group resorting to terrorism, the potential pool of recruits, and 
the state.  This study concluded that in the case of trans-national terrorism, a hawkish 
deterrence policy alone may not resolve an ongoing terrorism problem, and may be 
ineffective in reducing the level of terrorism.40  So a hawkish use of force in response to 
a terrorist campaign perpetuates the cycle of violence instead of decreasing it. 
Second is an argument made that the unintended consequences of anti-terrorism 
policies can be far worse than the intended consequences, and that they must be 
anticipated.  In a study done by Enders and Sandler, the U.S. retaliatory raid on Libya 
was examined and determined to have caused an increase in terrorism, with a small 
portion of this increase spilling over into states not involved in the retaliatory strikes.41 
Lastly, the argument has also been made that the use of massive force will not 
only fail to reduce terrorism, but has an escalating effect.   The initial case used to 
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illustrate this effect is the British Governments handling of the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) in which the British Government response of sending military troops in response to 
civilian riots effectively resurrected a previously inactive IRA into carrying out new 
attacks against the British.42  As has been noted by other scholars as well, the British 
heavy-handedness in Northern Ireland turned civil demonstrations to end discrimination 
into a campaign of terrorism to gain independence from Britain.43  The British war 
against the IRA in Northern Ireland shows how government use of force can escalate and 
increase terrorism, but are there more current studies more indicative of the threats faced 
from Terrorist groups like Al Qaeda? 
A more recent study of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) was undertaken to 
answer the question of whether or not the GWOT has reduced terrorism with its strategy 
of preemptive force.  The results of this study showed a 74% increase in terrorism after 
the onset of GWOT, and an increase in the number of incidents with deaths by 168%.44  
The war on terrorism is not reducing terrorism. This supports the previously discussed 
study that showed hawkish policies having the effect of escalating transnational 
terrorism.  Interestingly, when events in Israel, Iraq and Afghanistan were excluded from 
their analysis, the onset of GWOT was not found to significantly increase the number of 
transnational terrorist incidents, but the invasion of Iraq and the release of photos from 
Abu Ghraib were both found to have significant statistical effects on the number of 
incidents and the number of deadly incidents.  These results supported the second point 
made of unintended consequences of counterterrorism policies; as the invasion of Iraq 
and the Abu Ghraib incident were both key to subsequent transnational terrorism outside 
Israel and the Occupied Territories.  
What state policies are most successful in countering terrorism? From reviewing 
the different case studies, it is fair to say that counterterrorism policies that rely on force 
alone perpetuate the cycle of violence of a terrorist campaign, spread terrorism to other 
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44 Sheehan, "Has the Global War on Terror Changed the Terrorist Threat?" 752–754. 
 18
countries as an unintended consequence, and can in fact escalate the violence of a 
terrorism campaign.  Force alone cannot defeat the use of the tactic of terrorism however, 
and state policies that rely on force and take a hard-line stance against negotiating with 
terrorist organizations perpetuate the cycle of violence of a terrorist campaign.45   
What is effective in reducing terrorism depends on the group’s motivations, but 
successful state counterterrorism policies have been a combination of legal reforms, 
restrictions, and conciliations with the groups that resorted to the use of terrorism.  These 
successful state counterterrorism policies are reliant upon an understanding of the group 
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III. ENGAGEMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND DETERRENCE 
A. ENGAGEMENT TERRORIST GROUPS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS 
A multi-dimensional approach incorporating non-violent government 
counterterrorism policies of Conciliation, Restriction, and Legal Reform have proven to 
be more effective in reducing terrorism than force.46  These counterterrorism policies 
result in a state engage directly with groups that employed terrorism, what sort of 
engagement depends on the policies, but there will be engagement with them at in one 
way or another.  It may be directly negotiating with them as part of a conciliatory policy 
like the Canadian Government did with the Quebec Separatists, or it may be in 
prosecuting them as part of Legal Reform and Restrictions as the Italian Government did 
with the Red Brigade.  In any case, engagement with groups that resort to terrorism is 
going to happen eventually.  If Restriction and Legal Reform are successful in deterring a 
group from using terrorism to redress their grievances, there is still the issue of the 
group’s grievances that would need to be resolved or refuted, or the option of turning to 
the tactic of terrorism will still be there for the group to use at a later date.   
This thesis will use the argument made by several others that the underlying 
causes and grievances of a terrorism campaign must be addressed.  There are several 
reasons for this; states cannot counter something unless they understand what it is, and if 
states do not resolve the issue that caused a group to turn to terrorism in the first place 
states are only dooming yourself to repeat it.   
Utilizing the Martha Crenshaw model of how a terrorist campaign begins, the 
most effective counterterrorism policy would be to engage with minority groups before 
they turn to the tactic of terrorism before their grievances are aired publicly and met with 
force by the state.  In an ideal world this would be the perfect solution, but if that is 
carried out then there would potentially be no end to groups that petitioned states with 
grievances and states would not be able to effectively govern if they were  
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Engagement with terrorist groups is a key element in a states counterterrorism 
campaign and will eventually be implemented to either negotiate the successful 
conclusion of a terrorist campaign, or be incorporated into successful state 
counterterrorism policies to delegitimize the group’s use of terrorism.  This means there 
will be engagement of groups, perhaps even after they have implemented terrorism as a 
tactic to redress their grievances.   The expression “We do not negotiate with terrorists” 
should be taken out of the lexicon of state counterterrorism policy makers, as successful 
counterterrorism policies will inevitably reach the point where there will be discussions 
with the group on the successful conclusion of the terrorism and counterterrorism 
campaigns. 
State engagement of groups could also adopt a policy of acknowledging groups 
and their grievances to demonstrate a willingness to work with groups to resolve their 
grievances.  This will be a difficult policy decision to sell, as it is perceived as weak and 
conciliatory, and there is the commonly held belief that to give in to terrorism would only 
encourage more terrorism.  But it can be sold as the most effective way of reducing a 
terrorism campaign as it has the effect of turning the population against the groups by: 
Delegitimizing their use of terrorism to resolve a grievance the state is working to resolve 
legitimately; restrain from an overpowering use of force to counter civil disobedience and 
disruptions countering the perception of unjust state over reactions.  For a state to show 
restraint and not over react to groups grievance to turn the population against the use of 
terrorism as it has never been successful in its stated objectives.   
Groups that perpetrate terrorism are reliant on public support of their campaigns.  
Specifically they need the public to perceive their grievances as legitimate and the states 
use of force in response to terrorism as unjust.  This popular support of groups is what 
Mao Zedong characterized as “The water in which they swim.”  Without this passive 
support they would not be able to perpetrate terrorism campaigns.  If a state responds 
positively to a groups grievances and takes steps to remedy those grievances, that would 
delegitimize that group turning to terrorism to try and achieve resolution to those 
grievances that are being resolved through legitimate processes.   
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 Acknowledging and working to resolve group grievances would serve to deny 
them that support.  If the state is in fact responsive to the needs of minority groups and 
seeks to resolve their grievances, then the groups use of terrorism is not justified and they 
would not have the popular support of the people to provide them that “…water in which 
they swim.”  Another second order effect of engaging the groups is to delegitimize their 
use of violence not only because the state is legitimately working to resolve their 
grievances, but also because terrorism has never been successfully used to achieve the 
stated goals of the groups that use it.47   
Engaging groups cannot only take the form of addressing and resolving their 
grievances, but can also be done to bring them into the fold of the international 
community.  It has been argued that transnational and international institutions are what 
make peace, and that global development necessitates dialogue on a symmetric level.48  
Engaging minority groups to address and resolve their grievances can also serve as the 
foot in the door to bring in economic development for the purpose of establishing the 
‘long peace’ of economic globalization.   
Groups like Al Qaeda currently function transnational to achieve their recruiting, 
financial and operational objectives.  This thesis is arguing that engaging the groups in 
states that Al Qaeda currently recruits from and not only working to address and resolve 
their grievances but also engaging them to develop them economically to help them 
develop their own independent market economies and institutions necessary would help 
lessen the appeal of the Islamist message and deny them the outside support they need to 
continue to function.49 
B. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF STATES WITH DISAFFECTED 
MINORITY GROUPS  
If engaging minority groups is a key principal in reducing the violence in a 
terrorism campaign, what can be done to prevent the conditions described by Martha 
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Crenshaw?   As Admiral McMullin stated in his speech to NPS “The only way to defeat 
Islamic terrorism is to empower Muslims.”  How can states empower Muslims?  What 
economic options does a state have to assist developing nations in developing their 
economies?  This portion of the thesis will recommend a solution that is a combination of 
suggestions from a former Saudi Arabian Human Resources Expert, and from Fukuyama 
in an article in the Atlantic Journal.  In building up to that solution, this thesis will first 
make the case some of the characteristics of capitalist peace can be applied to developing 
nations and help increase their stability and serve to counter terrorism. 
There is an argument in favor of “Capitalist Peace,”50 or “fight terror with the 
trade,”51 which is supposed to support or supplant the “Democratic Peace” theory. The 
democratic peace theory argues that since history provides evidence that democratic 
nations do not fight among each other, world peace can be achieved through spreading 
ideals of democracy. On the other hand, Capitalist peace theory through comparative 
analysis of democracy and economic freedom in relation to Militarized International 
Conflicts (MIC) argue that it is not democracy, but economic freedom, that can bring 
world peace.52 With globalization, nations are becoming increasingly interdependent 
hence are finding a different forum for voicing their discontent rather than going into 
war. Similarly, they argue, globalization enhances peace among great powers, and 
“global production shift can, under certain conditions, increased the prospects for peace 
by contributing to the consolidation of deep, regional economic integration among long-
standing security rivals.”53   
Globalization and geographic dispersion of production can arguably help to 
reinforce great power peace. This is so for three reasons. Firstly, the dispersion of 
production across the globe makes military conquest expensive and risky. The aggressor 
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will have to expand geographically, thus increasing the aggressor’s own vulnerability that 
is not commensurate with the benefit of conquest. Secondly, the prospect for autarkic 
defense production is slimmer in a globalized world that deters the great powers from 
making aggressive wars.54 It may make large-scale military conquests unworthy, but it 
will bring to the fore the idea of low-intensity conflict and proxy war.  
Even if globalization leads to economic prosperity, ultimately, democratization of 
the world it is no guarantee of world peace. Strong evidences suggest that the process of 
democratization is more violent and conflict prone.55 It is difficult to imagine a smooth 
political transition in nations that are currently experiencing a surge of economic growth, 
such as China and Indonesia. They are bound to experience violent transitional politics, 
instability, and even the possibility of conflict. If we agree with the argument that 
globalization is assisting in democratizing the world, we must accept the evidence those 
transitional periods to democracy are the most violent ones. Thus, a causal relationship 
between globalization, turbulent politics and violence or insecurity can be explained.  
Globalization refers to the phenomenon that has led to more interdependent and 
integrated economies among the nations of the world. Although the idea, that there are 
huge economic benefits coming out of globalization, is now more easily accepted, there 
is a sharp polarization of opinion about its impact on non-economic aspects, primarily 
security.  
Similarly, since globalization has led to reductions in poverty and a visible rise in 
the living standards of billions of people worldwide, what is the need to revolt against 
government? Figures point out that between 1990 and 1999, more than 200 billion people 
escaped poverty in China and India, only because of their economic growth.56 It leads to 
the hypothesis that globalization leads to economic growth and reduces poverty, which 
addresses social grievances. Additionally, it leads to democratization, which leads to 
resolution of political grievances, leading to domestic stability and peace, meaning 
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globalization indirectly contributes to world security.  Moreover, if globalization has 
positive impacts on economic growth and benefits for the poor, then why are the people 
protesting violently in Seattle and Prague?  
This leads to the fundamental questions: What are the implications of 
globalization on security? How does it contribute to security or insecurity at the global 
level, inter-state and intra-state level? Has globalization contributed to the betterment of 
global security, or otherwise? Does economic globalization possess the capability to 
prevent conflicts, induce rapprochement and reconciliation between traditional security 
rivals, and contribute to the peace and stability of a nation?  
The paper argues that while economic dimension of globalization appears to 
improve security in general, some aspects of globalization, primarily non-economic, can, 
under certain conditions, contribute to insecurity. While it appears to reduce risks of 
conflict between great powers and stable states, and makes military conquest unnecessary 
at the global level, the globalization of production and distribution may cause conflict 
between and in the developing nations.57  
While globalization brings economic prosperity for the majority, it also creates 
clear-cut winners and losers. This may also prevent democratization of authoritarian 
nations or continuation of internal conflicts. Similarly, its socio-cultural impacts can lead 
to radicalization of certain section of the global society and give rise to a conflict between 
state and non-state actors, resulting in the destabilization of the internal security situation 
of a particular nation. Thus, while the benefits of globalization are many, it is not risk 
free, and there is a definite element of insecurity emanating from it.  
Just as Capitalist Peace diminishes wars between states, states that have market 
based economies and internally balanced economies are likely to have populations with 
fewer grievances, and have legitimate institutions for minority groups to redress 
grievances, consequently less justified in turning to the use of terrorism to redress their 
grievances.   
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Increased Foreign Direct Investment may reduce terrorism support by offering 
economic growth in the developing world.  This is not intended to say that poverty is the 
cause of terrorism and that eliminating poverty would eliminate terrorism.  It is argued 
that economic development produces changes in the populations and governments that 
make the conditions less favorable for groups to use terrorism.58  Economic development, 
financial markets, and monetary policy coordination all play a critical role in promoting 
peace.  Much of the impact of free markets on peace will be missed if much of what 
compromises capitalism is missing.59 In Gartszke’s study of conflicts from 1950–1992, 
Free Markets and development diminish disputes and war.  
Can this be accomplished by giving aid money to states?  In a study called ‘the 
curse of aid’ the journal of economic growth examined over 108 countries that received 
aid over a 39-year period from 1960–1999.  Aid is needed for developing nations to bring 
about structural reform.  Unfortunately, that aid often goes to politicians who appropriate 
these resources and use them to empower themselves and their allies while excluding 
their opposition from the political process, resulting in less participatory democracy and 
weaker institutions   In addition, the argument is made that foreign aid reduces the need 
for government taxes and therefore results weak governance.60 
What can states do to develop the institutions necessary to establish market 
economies and internally balanced economies in developing nations?  This paper will 
present the argument made by Fukuyama; establish the position of Director of 
Reconstruction on the white house staff.   
This position could function to oversee the post stabilization phase of combat 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan by establishing self-sustaining institutions in both 
countries.  Once successful in coordinating those effects in Iraq and Afghanistan the basic 
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principle of the success of building the institutions in a nation could be applied to other 
failed or failing like Somalia, Nigeria, and Yemen, then on to developing nations as well.   
A chief criticism of this is the idea that outsiders cannot build nations.  The key to 
the success of this proposed office would be a clear focus on its mission to build the state 
and not to build the nation itself.  State building meaning to strengthen governmental 
institutions like police, judiciaries, banks, tax collections agencies, health and education 
services.  In response to this argument, this author will defer to ….  
Similar to the way the UN and coalition forces provide military and police 
trainers to the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police,  this position could coordinate among the UN 
and U.S. institutions like the Commerce Department of Justice, Department of Education, 
IRS, etc. could partner with their Iraqi peer equivalent to develop those institutions and 
establish solid and long lasting relationships.   
What would be the incentive for other countries to spend their assets to develop 
the infrastructures of Iraq and Afghanistan?  The argument has been made that 
developing nations and failed or failing states are the biggest threat to their neighboring 
states, as well as international security as they provide a safe haven for terrorists, poverty, 
AIDS  
Why would the U.S. do this, what would be the incentive?  There are two 
incentives to do this: first would be the return on investment in a nation with a country 
that has the third largest oil reserves in the world.  One of the reasons we have such a 
strong relationship with the Saudi’s is because we built them up to be independent.  We 
could get the same return on our investment in Iraq  
This position would work through the United Nations to establish incentives for 
MNCs doing business in Iraq and Afghanistan to conduct their business through the 
developing institutions, as well as provide incentives for the host nations of those MNCs 
to provide personnel to help assist the development of the institutions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
The U.S. cabinet position could provide a semi-annual report to congress and the 
UN to ensure transparency in all dealings and to provide accountability of resources 
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allocated and progress on gated goals designed to make the institutions fully capable of 
functioning without any assistance from other countries or MNCs. 
Accountability of U.S. businesses and MNCs that are doing business with these 
same failed/failing states.  Provide incentives for working hand in hand with U.S. 
institutions to fund development of institutions in exporting states to establish solid 
institutions and peer-to-peer relationships with U.S. equivalent institutions for support.   
Establish penalties for U.S. businesses and MNCs that do business with states that lack 
well-established institutions with good peer-to-peer relationships with U.S. equivalent.  
C. ECONOMIC THREAT OF TERRORIST CAMPAIGNS  
Economic development and establishing legitimate institutions for redress of 
group grievances will not be perfect.  There may well still be groups with grievance that 
chose not to redress those grievances through the legitimate institutions.  Use of force 
will still need to be a part of the multi-dimensional approach to countering terrorism. 
With half of the U.S. oil supply imported, terrorist organizations like Al Qaida 
can disrupt the flow of oil into the U.S. by disrupting distribution routes.  According to 
the National Threat Assessment from the Director of National Intelligence Al Qaida 
leaders are interested in striking Persian Gulf oil facilities.61  Is there a history of 
demonstrated capability and intent of terrorist organizations to carry out attacks against 
oil infrastructure?   
Yes, there is a clear record that attacks against oil infrastructure have been a 
favorite of terrorists.  The transmission and distribution systems of oil infrastructure 
represent the Achilles heel of the oil industry.  Tankers and pipelines are the most 
vulnerable targets; tankers are too slow and cumbersome to maneuver away from 
attackers, and pipelines cover distances of hundreds of miles and a simple explosive 
device can puncture them and cause it to be non-operational.62   
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There are over 4,000 oil tankers delivering oil around the world, each of them are 
vulnerable to attack when geography forces them to pass through narrow straits to enter 
the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the straits of Malacca where all oil bound for China, 
Japan, and South Korea must pass.  As demonstration of that vulnerability, in October 
2002, Al Qaida rammed and badly damaged a French supertanker off the coast of Yemen 
with a boat packed with explosives.63 
While tankers and pipelines are both weaknesses in the oil distribution, 
destructive attacks on oil pipelines are more common than attacks against oil pipelines as 
evidenced by the following data on pipeline attacks.  In Colombia, their pipeline 
infrastructure has been attacked over 1,000 times since 1991, resulting in the loss over at 
least 2.9 billion barrels.  Attacks from 1991 to 1995 have resulted in a cumulative loss of 
nearly $1 billion.64  In Nigeria, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND) has been attacking the oil infrastructure as well, damaging pipelines and taking 
over oil facilities has decreased production capacity by about 30% from 2.9 MBD to 2.0 
MBD.65  In Saudi Arabia Al Qaeda suicide bombers attempted to detonate two Vehicle 
Borne Improvised Explosive Devices.66  
Al Qaida has stated their intentions to target Persian Gulf oil production, and 
Saudi Arabia is the largest producer in the Persian Gulf as well as a previous target of Al 
Qaida.   Saudi Arabia has seven main producing oil fields.  Ghawar oil field is the largest; 
it is currently producing half of Saudi Arabia’s capacity at 5 MBD, more than every other 
country except Russia and the U.S.  In descending order, here are the remaining Saudi oil 
fields and their current production: Safaniya - 1.4 MBD, Khurais - 1.2 MBD, Qatif - .5 
MBD, Shaybah - .5 MBD, Zuluf - .45 MBD, and Abqaiq - .4 MBD.   
Saudi Arabia has one main processing facility in Abqaiq.  The facility includes 
pumping stations, gas oil separation plants, hydro-desulfurization units, and is the key  
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junction connecting to the pipelines that carry the oil to their ports at Ras al-Ju’aymah, 
Ras Tanura, and Yanbu.  The plant has a capacity of more than 7 MBD, and processes 
nearly two-thirds of Saudi crude oil. 
The three ports listed above are the three primary export terminals; Ras Tanura 
handles more than 75% of the exports with a capacity of 6 MBPD, Ras al-Ju’aymah is 
capable of 3.6 MBPD, but the Yanbu terminal on the Red Sea handles the remaining 25% 
with a capacity of 4.5 MBD.  
Saudi Aramco operates more than 9,000 miles of petroleum pipelines throughout 
the country connecting their oil fields with their processing plants and their seaports.  The 
primary pipeline is the 745-mile, 5 MBD East-West pipeline that connects the Abqaiq 
refineries to the seaport at Yanbu.67    
How vulnerable is the Saudi infrastructure to attack?  Saudi Arabia has one 
primary oil field that produces most of its oil, and one primary facility that processes its 
oil, but as demonstrated by the failed Al Qaida attack in 2006 these are single site 
positions which they can man and establish effective defense perimeters and secure 
against attack.  However, they do not man and secure the entire span 750-mile span of 
their primary pipeline that carries over half of their exported oil.68  If that pipeline were 
attacked and destroyed, what impact would it have on the U.S. economy? 
Having established the U.S. dependence on foreign oil, the vulnerabilities of 
foreign oil infrastructure, and the demonstrated capability and intent of terrorist 
organization to attack oil infrastructure, what sort of risk do these attacks represent to the 
U.S.?  By attacking foreign oil infrastructure, could they cripple the U.S. economy? 
Given the stated intent of terrorist organizations is to cripple the U.S. economy 
with their attacks they are seeking to maximize the minimum operating costs of the oil 
industry by increasing the cost of operating the system, and decrease maximum 
throughput of the oil system.  Accomplishing these two things from their attacks on the 
oil infrastructure would amount to reducing the ability to make money from the system, 
and increasing the cost of operating the system beyond the system’s value.  In layman’s 
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terms, they would want to make it cost more to defend it and rebuild it, to increase the 
cost of the product beyond its worth to society.  The impact to the U.S. as a customer 
would be the increased price associated with the increased cost of production, as well as 
competition for the reduced product supply as a result of the attacks damaging the 
function and production of the oil system. 
How much oil production would attacks on oil infrastructure have to degrade it to 
break the U.S. economy?  There has been an argument made by Morgan Stanley cited in 
an attacker defender models that a reduction in Saudi oil output by 4 MBD from its 
current production of 9 MBD would cause worldwide economic distress.  This loss of oil 
production from Saudi Arabia would amount to 5% of the world demand, and this loss 
would cause the price of oil to jump from $40 a barrel to $80 a barrel.  The Morgan 
Stanley report argues that this jump in oil price would lead to a global recession if not 
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IV. MIDDLE EAST CASE STUDY 
A. TERRORIST THREAT 
This chapter will apply the previously discussed principles of engagement and 
economic development in a case study of the Middle East, and specifically focus on Al 
Qaeda.  This chapter will first explain clarify what Al Qaeda is and is not, then explain 
why the Middle East is a good case study of how to counter terrorism, and lastly make 
the case for economic development deterring terrorism in the Middle East.    
Islamism as a religious based social movement that believes in reasserting Islamic 
laws in Muslim societies that came about as a response to the failure of secular states in 
the Middle East and North Africa.  There are variations of Islamism in terms of what the 
problem is and what the solution is.  For example Political Islamism sees the problem as 
secularization and the influence of western states with a, and that the solution to this is 
for civic participation to effect the change to Islamism.  Jihadi Salafism on the other 
hand, sees the problem as Apostasy among ruling regimes, and advocates violent 
revolution to overthrow apostate regimes and implement sharia law.70  Islamism in 
general believes sees the Islamic religion as a comprehensive guide for all aspects of 
social and political life; family, economics, politics, etc.  As a belief, it advocates for 
states to be ruled by shariah law, for the rejection of secularization and Westernization, 
and for the rejection of modern ideologies over Islamic based values systems.   
Al Qaeda is a transnational Islamist Jihadist group that advocate for offensive 
Jihad against the far enemy of western states, specifically the U.S..  They believe that 
Muslims are under attack by the west, and that the best way of countering this is by 
conducting a global offensive to weaken the resolve of the west and the U.S. to be 
involved in Muslim affairs.  Their stated objective is to eject western and American 
political, military, economical and cultural influence in the Muslim world.71  Al Qaeda is 
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not a centralized structured movement, the term Al Qaeda was applied by western 
governments and the media to label a broad and diverse network of networks.72 
B. ENGAGE AND ACKNOWLEDGE GRIEVANCES 
Key to countering Al Qaeda’s influence and ability to recruit from nations across 
the Arab world would be to address their grievances and to show U.S. commitment in 
resolving those grievances.  What are the pan-arab grievances that Al Qaeda ties appeals 
to in its international recruiting?  Al Qaeda’s primary grievances are that the Muslim 
religion and its followers are under attack by a new crusade that seeks to destroy Islam.73   
The most important of these issues would be Israel and the creation of a 
Palestinian state.  As complicated as this issue it, it would take an entire thesis to propose 
a recommended solution to the Israeli Palestinian peace process, which is something this 
thesis is not prepared to do in this section of this thesis.  However, what this thesis is 
prepared to argue is that to undermine Al Qaeda use of this grievance to recruit members 
from among Arab nations is to alter the perception that the U.S. as on the side of the 
Israelis and is unconcerned with the plight of the Palestinians.  
Regardless of how it is done, the perception must be changed so that the U.S. is 
perceived as pushing for the creation of a Palestinian stated on the west bank.  Changing 
this perception could very well involve taking a hard stance against Israeli settlements in 
the west bank.  This would be a difficult perception to   to resolving Pan-Arab level 
This is where the proposed policy of engagement and development through the 
proposed cabinet position is key to changing this perception of the U.S..  First would be 
the economic development of Arab states through U.S. and international development of 
their economies toward complete market economies and internally balanced economies.  
This economic development would result in reducing unemployment By working with 
existing institutions of developing nations these nations can participate in global 
economics and reap the rewards of capitalist peace. 
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It has been argued that the way to tame extremist groups is to incorporate them 
into the government.  This argument states that participation in democratic institutions 
can turn extremists into moderates via three dynamics:  once groups commit to playing in 
electoral game they find themselves forced to compromise to try and attract a majority, 
participation in elections forces them to devote resources to running their political 
machinations instead of revolutionary activities, and that they would be forced to try and 
solve common problems instead of pushing their ideology.74   This theory was put forth 
as a lesson learned from extremist groups in Europe, would it apply to the Middle East? 
This theory was put into practice in Egypt when Sadat liberalized Nasser’s 
previously repressive stance against opposition groups and attempted political and 
economic liberalization.  The liberalization was successful in that it did incorporate the 
Muslim Brotherhood into the political process.  However, the theory of bringing them 
into the party would moderate their extremist positions did not prove to be the case with 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.   
Liberalization was successful in getting the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in 
the government, but it was not successful in moderating their extremist positions.  Letting 
the Muslim Brotherhood into the parliament as a political party allowed them to gain 36 
seats and become the leading opposition force and was able to advocate for inclusion of 
sharia law into the objectives of the labor party.  The Muslim Brotherhood took 
advantage of their newfound access to power to voice their demands and oppose and 
challenge the legitimacy of the regime.  Legitimizing the Muslim Brotherhood by 
granting them political power as a reward actually lead to their power growing and 
spreading into other civil societies and professional organizations.  These factors 
ultimately lead the state to reverse their policy of liberalization first with a policy of 
permissive repression aimed at militant Islamists, then a return to outright elimination of 
militant Islamists, specifically the Gama’a in Upper Egypt.75   
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Egyptian response to the Islamic Militant groups was indiscriminate and brutal; from 
1992-1997 the Egyptian government arrested more than 47,000 people, a number 
estimated to be greater than the actual number of militant Islamists.  The Islamist Militant 
response was just as violent with attacks from 1992-1997 numbering 741 with 1,442 
deaths, compared to 143 attacks and 120 deaths from 1970-1989.  Clearly proving the 
theory that reactive state repressive policies increase violent opposition out of a fear of 
losing what they have gained.76  
C. DEVELOP ECONOMIES 
Why is it important to develop the economies of the Middle East?  According a 
report by the international monetary fund, the population of the Middle East and North 
Africa has quadrupled since 1950 and will double in the next 50 years.  Jobs have not 
grown with the regions workforce, and unemployment has risen from 12.7% to 15%  for 
80%.  This bleak employment is one of the regions urgent destabilizing problems, fuels 
social tensions, and makes job creation a top priority.77  
The other primary factor that explains the resonance of the ideology of Islamism 
in mass politics is the poor economic conditions across the Middle East and North Africa.  
The population of the region as quadrupled since 1950, but job growth has not kept pace 
with population growth.  Unemployment in the 7 largest nations in the region has grown 
from 12.7 percent, to 15 percent.78 Look at the outrage in the U.S. and the attraction to 
the Tea Party Movement when our unemployment rate is less than 10%.  It’s no wonder 
that the destabilizing effect of a 15% unemployment rate is attracting people to a new 
political solution: out with secularism, in with Islamism.  Saeed Al Khabaz has 
characterized this as a typhoon of unemployment in the Arab world that creates social 
problems, and asserted that no community can survive this way.79 
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The inability of secular Arab leadership to correct the poor economic conditions 
of colonial rulers despite attempted educational and employment reforms serves to make 
the Islamist solution of a return to the Golden Era an even more appealing option.  If the 
economic solutions of the secular regimes were working and there was prosperity across 
the Middle East and North Africa, there would be no appeal of returning to the golden 
age. Combine these bleak economic prospects with repressive regime a policy toward the 
one group that is offering a perceived legitimate solution and the result is the growing 
appeal of the Islamist movement.    
The argument has been made that solution to unemployment in the Middle East is 
not by token support by foreign enterprise, but by forming strategic mentoring 
partnerships with foreign expertise.80  In support of that argument it is the 
recommendation of this thesis that the U.S. create a position in the white house cabinet 
tasked with overseeing the economic development of the two states we are currently 
fighting in, as well as other failing states across the middle east and north Africa.   
The purpose of this position would not be to develop the nations, but to develop 
the institutions of state-hood and market economies.  As has been argued by Fukuyama, 
outsiders cannot build nations in terms of repairing cultural or social ties, but what could 
be done is the strengthening of government institutions, and this paper will argue assist in 
developing complete market economies. 
For this recommended position to be able to effectively achieve its goals it would 
have to have the central authority to operate within the executive branch.  If it were put 
under the secretary of state, it would not have the authority to interact in a directive 
capacity toward other directorates.  If it were a cabinet position in the white house staff, it 
would be in a position to engage other departments in a directive manner to achieve its 
stated goals.  Civilian leadership in developing the economies and institutions to lessen 
the perception of western crusaders seeking to destroy the Muslim religion and its 
practitioners, but could instead serve as an example of western governments empowering 
Muslims and helping them succeed and prosper. 
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This position could serve as a central authority over the U.S. institutions of 
governance and market economy and lead them in engagement and development of 
similar institutions in developing nations.  Establishment of peer-to-peer relationships 
among developing nation institutions would be critical in helping those institutions 
develop and become stronger and more effective in performing their role and therefore 
helping stabilize and strengthen their states.  For example, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce could work with their foreign equivalent and help to regulate trade, the U.S. 
department of Education could work with their foreign equivalent to help develop their 
educational systems.  
Once these peer-to-peer relationships are established, they could also help 
facilitate Foreign Direct Investment in developing nations to ensure that investments are 
protected and optimally targeted for the benefit of the developing nation as well as the 
investor. 
As a position in the White House cabinet, this position could also interface with 
the international community and the international community to lend their support in 
engaging developing nations with their developed nation equivalent institutions. 
D. IMBALANCED ECONOMIES DECREASING SECURITY  
There is no disputing that economic globalization can contribute to improved 
security between developed nations, but the argument has been made that globalization 
can be a negative for security between developing nations and mixed between developed 
and developing nations.81  This portion of the paper will argue that the insecurity of 
developing nations is a relevant threat to international security, and will apply economic 
models to two case studies to better understand the source of the insecurity.  
The issue of negative security impacts of trade between developed nations and 
developing nations takes on new meaning in a post-9/11 world.  The terrorist attacks of 
9/11 demonstrated the capability of non-state actors to attack and threaten a state’s 
security.  This represents a paradigm shift away from states being the primary threat to 
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another state’s security, and introduces non-state actors as a threat to international 
security.   Given this paradigm shift, there is a need for renewed emphasis and 
understanding of exactly how it is that trade with developing nations can negatively 
impact international security.  For developed and developing states to reap the benefits of 
increased stability from international trade, states need to be economically stable, i.e., 
have fully employed and internally balanced economies.82   
The economics of globalization is predicated on the idea of free trade between 
states with free markets.83  This section of the project will first review the key 
components of what constitutes free trade and free markets, and then use those 
components as criteria to examine two case studies of developing nations.  The argument 
will be made that international trade with states that do not have free trade and free 
markets will not increase stability and security, and can negatively impact international 
security.   
Free markets for the purposes of this project will be based on the simple market 
model and include; factor markets of households as paid resources working for 
businesses to produce goods and services, and product markets with businesses providing 
goods and services consumed by households, and government collecting taxes and 
providing public goods.84  Free trade in this discussion will refer to competitive markets 
of many buyers & sellers of a standardized product with low barriers to entry, and most 
important of all will be good information and institutions.85  These components of strong 
economies and financial systems are a must for international trade to reduce the risks of 
globalization.86  Using Saudi Arabia as one of two case studies, this paper will argue that 
Saudi Arabia does not have a free and complete market or an internally balanced 
economy, and that this negatively impacts international security.  Nigeria will be the 
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other case study to argue that corrupt institutions and corrupt Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) can also negatively impact international security. 
In terms of Saudi Arabia’s product market, the primary industry in Saudi Arabia 
is the exportation of oil, with oil exports accounting for 75% of its GDP.87  The Saudi 
Aramco oil company is the oil company in Saudi Arabia, and it is run by the Saudi 
Arabian Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources.  This primary source of GDP is 
the nationalized exportation of a raw material, which has been argued, is a factor 
contributing to the exacerbation of internal conflicts on its own.88  While this alone is a 
factor for internal insecurity, there are additional factors in the Saudi Arabian case study 
that also contribute to its insecurity, and international insecurity. 
In terms of the factor market in Saudi Arabia, there is a distinct lack of 
households as a business source receiving wages from working as labor for business.  
Saudi Arabia has a labor force, but they are foreigners who are there on a temporary basis 
to work for the Saudi Arabian government and their wages are applied to households in 
their host nations.  Saudi Arabia has a population of approximately 28,000,000 citizens 
whose primary source of income is government disbursement of oil revenues.  The 
primary labor force in Saudi Arabia is the approximately 6,360,000 guest workers who 
are the primary labor force the country.  These guest workers are not citizens of Saudi 
Arabia, but are typically working on two-year contracts, with their families remaining in 
their country of origin with their earnings sent home to support their families.89 
Additionally, Saudi Aramco is staffed by 16,000 foreign workers who live in a secluded 
compound away from the rest of the Saudi Population.  Again, these are foreign workers 
whose households are not spending money in the Saudi market, but are instead spending 
their wages to support households in their home countries.   
There have been unsuccessful attempts at Saudization (putting Saudi citizens to 
work in Saudi Arabia), but these have not significantly changed the labor force.  These 
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attempts included building seven universities; but the first round of 120,000 graduates 
from 1995–1999 represented 2% of the Saudi’s entering the workforce.  “We will not be 
a country of clerks” is the quote often provided by Saudi citizens to explain why they do 
not want to work.  Evidence in this regard point towards a particular subset, which is 
“unemployment among youth” as the independent variable for radicalization. Ahmed 
Rashid and Khashan’s research found that Islamic radicalization in Central Asia and 
Palestine is related to the issue of unemployment.90  This demonstrates the negative 
impact of economic globalization in the radicalization of youths, which further leads to 
insecurity both in domestic and global context. 
Saudi Arabia’s government control of its primary industry, subsidies to Saudi 
citizens, and its reliance on foreign workers result in an incomplete market cycle that is 
lacking in Saudi households working in Saudi business.  This incomplete market cycle 
results in an internally imbalanced economy that prevents Saudi Arabia from enjoying the 
stability benefit of economic globalization, and also negatively impacts international 
security as Saudi Arabia has been found to be a major source of funding for Al Qaeda 
through donations to religious charities.91   
Nigeria represents a case study of a developing nation that lacks the good 
institutions necessary for free trade and, therefore, the security benefit of economic 
globalization.  The oil industry in Nigeria accounts for 80% of its $335 Billion GDP (36th 
in the world).  Nigerian per Capita GDP is $2,300, yet 70% of the population of Nigeria 
lives below the poverty line, with the average Nigerian earning less than one dollar a 
day92.  The money made by the oil industry supports 10% of the labor force, but 
detrimentally impacts 70% of the labor force with no compensation for the degradation to 
their livelihood.   
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Corruption is rampant throughout the government of Nigeria, and it has resulted 
in the inability of several of its institutions to function on behalf of the people.  It is 
estimated that over $380 billion has been expropriated by Nigeria’s political and military 
leaders since oil sales began in the 1970s.93  This is the very money that the government 
of Nigeria should have been using to provide infrastructure, services and security for the 
people of Nigeria that instead was squandered by corrupt government officials.  
Additionally, Only .9% of the Nigerian GDP is being spent on education, ranking Nigeria 
180th in the world, and in this aspect supports the direct tie to levels of corruption and 
GDP spent on education. 94   
The corruption in Nigeria does not reside with the government alone.  There are 
multiple examples of the foreign companies doing business in Nigeria, bribing Nigerian 
government officials.  In 2007, Siemens was found guilty of paying Ten million Euros in 
bribes to Nigerian officials between 2001 and 2004.  U.S. corporations have also been 
caught contributing to the corruption of the Nigerian government: Halliburton reached a 
$177 million settlement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in February 
2009 for bribing a Nigerian gas plant, and Kellogg Brown and Root paid a $402 million 
fine to settle the case with the U.S. Justice Department.95  
The case study of Nigeria demonstrates that government and FDI corruption can 
prevent developing nations from establishing good institutions.  Without good 
institutions, there is not free trade, and therefore in the case of developing nations without 
those good institutions there is no stability benefit of international economics.   
This chapter has made the case that for developed and developing states to reap 
the benefits of increased stability from international trade, states need to be economically 
stable, i.e., have fully employed and internally balanced economies.96  The economics of 
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globalization are predicated on the idea of free trade between states with free markets.97  
This section of the project has focused on the key components of free trade and free 
markets and used those as criteria to examine two case studies of developing nations.  
These case studies have demonstrated that international trade with states that do not have 
free trade and free markets will not increase stability and security, and can negatively 
impact international security.   
The chapter has argued that while economic dimension of globalization can 
improve security, some aspects of globalization can contribute to insecurity. While it 
appears to reduce risks of conflict between great powers and stable states, and makes 
military conquest unnecessary at the global level, the globalization of production and 
distribution may cause conflict between and in the developing nations.  
As Brooks points out, although there is a great deal of positive impact of 
globalization of production on overall global security, it is still “a net negative for 
security relations among developing countries and is mixed for relations between great 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Groups have demonstrated that terrorism can be used to have a level of effect on 
international peace and security that was previously only achievable in state on state 
warfare.  The ability of nonstate actors to be capable of having the same impact on global 
security as a state necessitates a change in the previous policies in dealing with non-state 
actors.  A hard line stance of not dealing with groups that use terrorism is no longer a 
sustainable position.  This thesis has argued for the case of states adopting multi-
dimensional policy approaches to countering the use of terrorism to include engagement 
and economic development, as well as deterrence.   
In presenting this case, the argument has been made that the security benefits of 
the economics of globalization can be applied to developing nations.  Developing nations, 
and internally imbalance nations are a source of regional instability and are a net negative 
for global security.  Economic development of developing nations can produce strong 
institutions necessary for minority groups to resolve grievances and build internally 
balanced market economies in developing nations that allow them to fully participate in 
economic globalization and reap the security benefits of globalization.      
It is in the best interests of developed nations to lend their support to developing 
independent governmental institutions in developing nations so that they can achieve 
internally balanced economies necessary to reap the benefits of globalization.   This 
thesis has recommended establishing a formal appointed position within the U.S. tasked 
with overseeing the establishment of peer-to-peer institutional relationships between 
developed and developing nations to achieve that effect. 
Terrorism is a tactic that cannot be defeated.  States policies cannot rely on force 
alone in an attempt to defeat the use of a tactic.  Engaging groups that use terrorism to 
address and resolve their grievances can prevent the cycle of violence of a terrorism 
campaign and delegitimize their use of force to resolve grievances.  States need to use 
more effective counterterrorism policy options than coercion and force to deter groups 
from using terrorism.   
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